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In her book, The public perspective: public justification and the ethics of 
belief, Maria Paola Ferretti discusses in an interesting and original way the 
question of how moral and political rules can be made justifiable to all 
individuals living in pluralistic societies, where each person has a 
potentially different notion of the good life. This is a fundamental question 
in a free and pluralist society. Ferretti adheres to the idea that government 
activities must be justified to all citizens for public purposes, so that those 
who are subject to them can freely assent. This refers to the philosophical 
concept of public justification. Ferretti contributes to the debate by 
supporting the idea that public justification is only conceivable if people 
agree on a shared ethics of belief. Through this concept, she refers to a 
collection of epistemic and moral principles that lead to the reshaping of 
the beliefs that form our public worldview. Ferretti claims that Locke’s 
concept of the ethics of belief is firmly founded in the liberal tradition and 
it might be revitalized to address important aspects of contemporary 
liberalism. 
 
The book is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, Ferretti 
launches a debate in chapter 2, Public Reasoning and Agreement, by 
contrasting two prominent models: John Rawls’s and Gerald Gaus’s, to 
examine the link between justification and agreement in liberal political 
theory. She moves to chapter 3, The Ethics of Belief and the Liberal 
Tradition, where she advocates John Locke's ethics of belief as a theory 
that may be useful in reducing conflict in situations where it cannot be 
eliminated and disagreement should be accepted rather than solved. In 
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chapter 4, Having Reasons and Giving Reasons, Ferretti proposes that, 
rather than focusing on people as reasonable, we should focus on 
reasonable beliefs. She illustrates the difference between beliefs that are 
apt for public justification and beliefs that are not. In chapter 5, Facing 
Disagreement, she discovers points of agreement between people who hold 
opposing views but live in the same community rather than in separate 
communities. She examines and assesses her ideas in the real world in 
chapter 6, Equal Freedom, where she explains that her concept of equal 
freedom restricts the types of justifications that can be used to justify 
proposals for public norms. When determining whether a proposal is 
justified, we must consider if it is compatible with others’s equal freedom, 
or whether it respects them as moral agents. Ferretti finishes with chapter 
7, Liberal Multiculturalism, and explores the idea of respect for people as 
free, which involves respect for the fact that people exercise their freedom 
in groups. 
 
Ferretti introduces public justification as a debate that takes place on 
multiple levels, including epistemology, metaethics, institutional design, 
and tolerance. She tells her readers that not all sides of the argument will 
be considered, and that many questions will have to be overlooked. Ferretti 
focuses on the relevance of free moral agency and the idea that people do 
not reach the same reasonable conclusions while exercising free moral 
agency. 
 
Ferretti begins the topic in Chapter 2 with a focus on the link between 
public reason, justification, and agreement in liberal political theory, with 
John Rawls’s consensual model and Gerald Gaus’s convergence model 
being discussed as two contrasting approaches to the use of public reason. 
The agreement on principles of public order, according to both Rawls and 
Gaus, must be guided by reasons that are recognized as such from the 
evaluative point of view of each citizen. 
 
Ferretti criticizes Rawls’s shared agreement. According to this conception, 
public justification is based on reasons that can be expected to be shared 
by reasonable people when entering public debates. Ferretti’s objection is 
that it is not clear how we will create room for a new consideration that 
could indicate to us that generally accepted premisses are wrong to uphold 
the principles of justice, if we have to reason using a premiss that has 
already been accepted. Ferretti argues that Rawls’s idea of consensus is 
conservative, given the fact that the reasons currently accepted do not 
provide the resources to address some of the ongoing irregularities. This 
suggests that we need new perspectives in public debates. Also, in the 
Rawlsian model, despite public justification being based on shared 
reasons, it is possible to support injustice against minorities, because 
Iva Martinić: Maria Paola Feretti, The Public Perspective, Rowman & Littlefield, 2018 
 7 
members of minorities often offer reasons that are not commonly accepted, 
but also reasons that are not ‘shared’ in the normative sense indicated by 
Rawls. Likewise, in Rawls’s view, a number of negotiations and vetoes on 
rule proposals can be dismissed as unreasonable and decisions that are 
challenged are declared to be justified, despite the challenges. This 
represents a case of undesirable exclusion of minorities. 
 
Gaus considers it wrong to select reasons that may enter the public 
justification of a law and to establish that only some reasons are 
appropriate in public justification, in the way Rawls does this. Instead, the 
role of public debate is to articulate the values and reasons that a wide 
variety of people support despite their diverging worldviews. People 
should be able to express the reasons for their support, both in public 
debate and when voting on political issues. Justification is obtained when 
the variety of reasons employed by people with diverging worldviews 
converge on the same public decisions. When there is no convergence, a 
proposal is defeated and deemed unjustified in the process of public 
justification, by virtue of the opposition of some people. However, Ferretti 
claims that, in contrast to Gaus, she presents his model with idealized 
people, referred to as Members of the Public, rather than real-life people. 
Thus, we face the problem of what to do with real opinions that real people 
with all sorts of dubious, or, even flawed, epistemic engagements (rather 
than idealized members of the public), express for or against certain 
proposals. In a public debate, people sometimes cast doubt on very well-
established concepts, for example by casting doubt on widely accepted 
scientific knowledge. We therefore seem to need some normative guidance 
to know when these objections have a place in public justification. In 
opposition to Gaus’s thesis that it is sufficient for a law to be justified from 
all perspectives, and that the common result counts as public justification, 
Ferretti emphasizes that the public justification of a law implies both 
epistemic and motivational reasons.  
 
Thus, Ferretti dismisses both models, saying that Rawls’s concept of 
shared reasons is conservative and internally exclusive and, although the 
joint agreement reached by Gaus seeks to be more inclusive, it separates 
public reasoning from public justification. In both models, Ferretti argues, 
the critical role of public reason is threatened in certain key ways. 
  
The theory of public justification offered by Ferretti is based on 
reconnecting public reasons with the actual beliefs of people about the 
reasons that they (and others) have, and the arguments that citizens 
exchange with each other to ensure that agreement is not static or passively 
accepted but open to the scrutiny of alternative evaluative perspectives. 
She aims to show how the reasons that we have, and the reasons that we 
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give others, are interconnected and influence each other by exploring the 
ways in which agreement and disagreement are both vital for a liberal 
society, and how the reasons that we have and the reasons that we give to 
one another are interconnected and exercise mutual influence (30). Thus, 
different notions of good can be a source of disagreement, but despite such 
disagreement, we recognize the fundamental importance of treating others 
as free moral agents, which, according to Ferretti, requires justice.  
  
In chapter 3, she argues that a moderate interpretation of foundationalism 
is shown to be appropriate for a theory of public justification. She 
introduces Locke’s ethics of belief, or belief governance, by stating that a 
well-grounded belief needs not to be indefeasible. The concept of the ethics 
of belief assumes that we may be held responsible for what we believe, 
which requires that we exercise deliberate control over our beliefs. This 
includes gathering information and deciding whether to accept or reject it. 
What individuals can be held responsible for are such actions in the process 
of belief formation. The focus of the discussion is on the rules that we use 
to convey evidence and weigh probability, rather than on the beliefs 
themselves.  
 
In a morally pluralistic society, Ferretti argues for a rational examination 
of beliefs in which belief reformation and governance should be at the core 
of a project for public ethics. In her view, Locke’s theory of beliefs and the 
idea of alethic obligation represent a valid approach to these ends. Locke 
asserts that each of us has an obligation to believe what is true, and thus 
presents the first rigorous formulation of what has come to be known as 
alethic obligation (from the Greek aletheia, truth) (44). Alethic obligation 
applies indirectly as a requirement to resist doxastic practices that do not 
have truth (or high probability) as a main criterion of inquiry. Through this, 
Ferretti provides a novel answer by combining moral and epistemic factors 
in a way that allows us to bear responsibility for our views. We must assert 
that the reasons we have are true. Citizens should be responsible believers 
and defer to experts, according to Ferretti, who are able to match their 
beliefs with those held by the scientific community.  
 
Such a viewpoint, in my opinion, has a flaw. The issue that I want to 
highlight here is that Ferretti’s theory does not respond to the demand that 
she has established for a theory of public justification. This is the 
requirement that those who are subject to a government can freely assent 
to its decisions. In fact, Ferretti does not specify what we should do about 
the problem of lay people not understanding the reasons of experts due to 
their lack of scientific terminology or because they have no political 
knowledge, which is why they turn out to be irresponsible and irrational. 
It appears that the value of the public’s perspective and the justified 
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judgment of experts is limited to those who have previously done their 
homework on the subject. But most people do not have the ability to 
question experts (even when they are wrong or when there is no consensus 
in the scientific community). They cannot recognize experts or when 
someone is just pretending to be one, and then they turn to untrustworthy 
and easier to understand sources. An example of this could be the many 
conspiracy theories and video essays on the global pandemic currently 
going on. Thus, Ferretti’s Lockean proposal does not satisfy the 
requirement that government activities must be justified to all citizens for 
public purposes. 
 
Ferretti builds on Locke in chapter 4, pointing out that citizens have an 
alethic obligation to employ the method of probability when they want to 
convey their reasons to others. She starts with the concept of the ethics of 
belief, which assumes that we may be held responsible for what we believe, 
which requires that we exercise deliberate control over our beliefs. 
According to Locke’s theory, the nature of beliefs contains an essential 
ambiguity, which provides answers to the question of how to approach 
different perspectives. This includes gathering information and deciding 
whether to accept or reject it. What individuals can be held responsible for 
are their actions in the process of belief formation. As a result, the focus of 
the discussion is on the rules that we use to convey evidence and weigh 
probability, rather than on the beliefs themselves. 
 
She opposes the method of probability to a subjective approach, and she 
shows how conflict can develop if we understand the alethic obligation in 
a subjective way, using an example of Galileo’s beliefs that did not derive 
from the probability method. This method selects the kind of beliefs that 
are properly employed in public justification. On the one hand, there are 
non-givable reasons based on intimate experience, and reasons that are 
contingently or necessarily un-givable, that are not properly employed in 
public justification. On the other hand, there are reasons that are considered 
in public justification. Such are beliefs that correspond to the shared ethics 
of beliefs.  
 
Ferretti returns to this topic in the next chapter, Facing Disagreement, 
stating that it is difficult to decide which proposals or positive rules should 
be endorsed from a public perspective and how much personal freedom 
should be granted. Namely, justification, as defined by public reasoning, 
can resolve a wide range of issues, but it also has significant drawbacks. 
Thus, justified public laws and choices should be upheld strongly, but with 
a fallibilist mindset that permits us to perceive them as perpetually 
revisable and changeable. 
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In chapter 6, Ferretti advocates a view of freedom that is consistent with 
the idea that different people have different ideas about what is good. In 
such a conception, freedom is equal for all, which implies, too, that it is 
limited for each person. This, she believes, ensures or defends a certain 
degree of independence from outside pressures. 
 
She continues with chapter 7, by stating that cultural claims can be 
described as claims to freedom in cases where others, or the government, 
claim interference with cultural practices (152). In this context, Ferretti 
argues that respect for people as free requires (i) respect for the fact that 
people exercise their freedom in groups and (ii) the limits of public 
justification when the matter is constituted by deciding what people in 
groups should be free to do. 
  
She responds to Brian Barry’s remarks in this section. He says that the 
liberal commitment to equality requires similar treatment for all people, 
irrespective of their sex, race, or culture, with no space for a ‘politics of 
difference’. Ferretti agrees with Barry that some public norms must 
universally apply to cultural groups, irrespective of their differences, but 
she deems his expectations to be excessively strict. The reason for her view 
is based on the fallibilism and limitations of public justification, she argues 
in the previous chapters. Thus, when the matter is represented by cultural 
claims, Ferretti believes that a liberal conception of public life must not 
neglect the fact that people disagree about public issues, often in extreme 
ways. Consequently, the prevailing culture of society should not be used 
to justify broad norms that overlook such disagreements. Instead, the goal 
is represented by the harmonious coexistence of freedom and equality of 
citizens, which implies some restrictions on interference in inside group 
relations. As a result, she argues that the reasons for multicultural policies 
are grounded in an idea: (i) of respect for people as free, which requires 
respect for the fact that people exercise their freedom in groups and (ii) on 
the limit of public justification in relation to decisions that concern whether 
people should be free to exercise their cultural practices inside their 
communities. 
 
I find (ii) problematic. Ferretti’s strategy on the question of multicultural 
respect for communities seems objectionable to me. In particular, I think 
that in her view there is a hardly sustainable distinction between the private 
and the public sphere. This is problematic, on the one hand, because some 
multicultural claims are explicitly directed to the public domain. An 
example is the recent Vatican protests against a newly proposed law, called 
the Zan Law, that would punish discrimination and incitement to violence 
against the LGBT community, women, and people with disabilities. The 
Vatican claims the law will legally restrict the religious freedoms 
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guaranteed by the treaty between the Vatican and the Republic of Italy. 
According to the Vatican, with the protection of these groups, Catholics 
could also face legal action for expressing opinions on LGBT issues. 
However, the Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, rejected Vatican’s 
complaint in the name of the secularity of the state. Here we have an 
illustration of the problematic distinction between the domains that are 
defined as public and those that are not. Thus, it is not sufficiently clear 
which space needs to be excluded from the interference through public 
justification and universal norms. 
 
Some internal cultural practices, on the other hand, are completely 
unacceptable in terms of universal justice and universal rights. Here, we 
see the dubious sustainability of some cases of protection of the non-public 
sphere, because too important universal norms and values are at stake.  Let 
me return to Barry’s assertion that the liberal commitment to equality 
requires similar treatment for all people, irrespective of their sex, race or 
culture, with no space for a ‘politics of difference’. Such politics include 
exemptions of parents from some forms of care of their children, like health 
care, based on cultural or religious reasons. A good illustration of this is a 
case of denial of treatment that happened in 2016 in Rijeka (Croatia). A 
nine-year-old was diagnosed with lymph node cancer, and when he arrived 
at the hospital, his neck was visibly swollen. But after a day in the hospital, 
his parents pulled him out of the hospital, despite the doctor’s insistence 
that he should receive chemotherapy. They signed the outing explaining 
that they wanted a second opinion and subjected him to alternative 
methods of treatment because the child’s father claimed that chemotherapy 
was ‘war poison’. A further example is represented by the illustration 
Barry gives of the Jewish and Muslim traditions to slaughter animals in 
conformity with particularly cruel practices.  
 
Ferretti criticizes Barry’s argument as a harsh expression that prevents 
tolerance and the freedom of people, who, according to her, must have the 
opportunity to live according to the reasons that, in their views, justify 
practices. However, as expressed in the examples, allowing religious and 
other cultural reasons to justify practices in the public domain makes it 
difficult to establish a boundary of the legitimacy of these reasons and the 
practices that they justify. The question is important, because, by allowing 
free choices to members of a group with certain customs and principles, 
others are deprived of their freedom of choice, or other basic rights. Thus, 
even Ferretti’s solution of multicultural policies and reasons does not meet 
the condition of a liberal state that all citizens be treated as equal and free.  
 
To conclude, Ferretti’s proposal has relevant merits. She has made a vital 
and creative addition to the debate on public justification with The Public 
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Perspective. She succeeds in reminding liberal theory of some of its 
foundations, with the original contribution, in the contemporary context, 
of revitalizing the Lockean probability method and the ethics of belief in 
such a way that they can be utilized as guidelines for contemporary liberal 
theories of democracy. Thus, her book offers an original proposal that 
inserts, in an interesting way, epistemological considerations into a public 
justification theory respectful of pluralism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
